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Abstract: The High Redundancy Actuator (HRA) project investigates the use of a relatively
high number of small actuation elements, assembled in series and parallel in order to form a
single actuator which has intrinsic fault tolerance. Both passive and active methods of control
are planned for use with the HRA. This paper presents a multiple-model control scheme for a
10x10 HRA applied through the framework of multi-agent control.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Traditional Approaches to Fault Tolerant Actuation
In automated processes, faults in hardware or software
will often produce undesired reactions. These faults could
result in failures, where the system as a whole does not
complete an expected action. Failures can cause damage
to the plant, its environment, or people in the vicinity of
that plant [Blanke et al., 2001]. Fault Tolerant Control
(FTC) aims to prevent failures and their consequences by
providing adequate system performance in the presence of
faults.
The majority of FTC research to date has concentrated on
sensor faults. Significant advances have been made in this
area, but most of these strategies are not applicable to
actuator faults. This is attributable to the fundamental
differences between actuators and sensors. Sensors deal
with information, and measurements may be processed or
replicated analytically to provide fault tolerance. Actua-
tors, however, must deal with energy conversion, and as a
result actuator redundancy is essential if fault tolerance is
to be achieved in the presence of actuator faults. Actuation
force will always be required to keep the system in control
and bring it to the desired state [Patton, 1991].
The common solution for fault tolerant actuation in crit-
ical systems involves straightforward parallel replication
of actuators. Each redundant actuator must be capable
of performing the task alone and possibly override the
other faulty actuators. This solution is over-engineered,
reducing the efficiency of the system i.e. in triplex systems
200% more capability, cost and weight than required is
introduced to ensure a certain level of reliability.
1.2 High Redundancy Actuation
High Redundancy Actuation (HRA) is a novel approach
to actuator fault tolerance that aims to reduce the over-
engineering incurred by traditional approaches. The HRA
concept is inspired by musculature, where the tissue is
composed of many individual cells, each of which provides
a minute contribution to the overall contraction of the
muscle. These characteristics allows the muscle, as a whole,
to be highly resilient to individual cell damage.
This principle of co-operation in large numbers of low
capability modules can be used in fault tolerant actuation
to provide intrinsic fault tolerance. The HRA uses a high
number of small actuator elements, assembled in parallel
and series to form one high redundancy actuator (see
Figure 1). Faults in elements will affect the maximum
Figure 1. HRA and MAS.
capability, but through control techniques, the required
performance can be maintained. This allows the same
level of reliability to be attained in exchange for less over-
dimensioning.
The HRA is an important new approach within the overall
area of fault tolerant control. When applicable, it can
provide actuators that have graceful degradation, and that
continue to operate at close to nominal performance even
in the presence of multiple faults in the elements.
1.3 Control of High Redundancy Actuation
The main focus of the HRA project thus far has utilised
robust control methods. These techniques have been shown
to be theoretically viable for fault tolerant control of low
levels of redundancy [Du et al., 2007], and successful prac-
tical testing of these results on a two-by-two electrome-
chanical HRA was achieved.
More recently, electromagnetic actuation has been used
as elements of the HRA, the modelling of which in both
nominal and fault condition has been detailed in [Davies
et al., 2008b]. Research is ongoing into the robust control
of these elements at higher levels of redundancy [Steffen
et al., 2007]. Results to date suggest that robust control
should be a satisfactory method of achieving fault tol-
erant control of these structures. Indeed in most cases,
the robust, passive 1 control approach is attractive, as its
simplicity and constancy mitigate many of the associated
problems with active control methods. However, research
into more intelligent, active approaches is also an objective
of the HRA project, to ascertain the levels of fault toler-
ance and nominal performance attainable in comparison
to passive methods.
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are the focus of this active
fault tolerance scheme. MAS was chosen as an intelligent
approach to controlling the HRA as the two concepts are
strongly related (Figure 1).
1.4 Overview
[Davies et al., 2008a] presented a Multi-Agent Control
(MAC) scheme for a 4x4 HRA, which was found to be
advantageous in terms of fault tolerance in comparison to a
passive approach. However, it was questioned whether the
approach would still provide tangible benefits at higher,
more realistic levels of redundancy. Hence, this paper
extends the application of MAC concepts to a 10x10 HRA
to address this issue. In addition, the possibility of fault
misdiagnosis is also considered. Section 2 briefly introduces
agent concepts and discusses the rationale behind MAC of
HRA. The current MAC scheme is described in Section 3.
Section 4 then provides details of the control of a 10x10
HRA using passive and MAC means.
2. MULTI-AGENT CONTROL OF A HIGH
REDUNDANCY ACTUATOR (MACHRA)
2.1 Multi-Agent Control
An agent is a physical or virtual entity situated in its envi-
ronment, which acts autonomously and flexibly within its
purview to achieve goals in a real-time manner [Jennings
et al., 1998]. A MAS, therefore, is a collection of agents
that are socially coupled and collaborate to achieve objec-
tives, which in the case of MAC are the control objectives
of the application.
These agent characteristics resemble the concept of closed-
loop control, which achieves objectives through sens-
ing and acting. However, there are important differences
within the agent concept. The most obvious difference is
the social interaction and negotiation that exists between
agents. Also, the agent philosophy is strongly associated
with localisation, a point emphasised by [Ferber, 1999].
2.2 Rationale for Multi-Agent Control of HRA
MAS and HRA are conceptually similar (Figure 1). Both
are inspired by natural mechanisms which utilise vast num-
bers of relatively simple cells/processes to form complex
structures/behaviours.
1 In this context, passive refers to a static control structure and
algorithm.
This similarity in their structuring is the key rationale
for combining MA ideas with HRA. The structuring of
control is often neglected in the field of control engineering
as the problem is stated in the form of a single plant
model [van Breemen and de Vries, 2000]. The process
industry acknowledges that the structuring of control is
an important issue when applied to a decomposed system,
thus it is given more attention in this field and numerous
MACS have been proposed in this application area e.g.
[Wang and Wang, 1997].
The HRA is a complex, highly structured system, with
well-defined interactions between simple elements. An un-
structured approach will have difficulties dealing with this
complexity. However, if the HRA is viewed as a collection
of simpler, similar (if not identical), physically distributed
modules, the complexity and changeable nature of the
system's dynamics and structure can be handled at a
local level, allowing objectives to be met with greater
speed and efficiency. MASs facilitate the control of such
decompositions, allowing simple control algorithms in con-
junction with simple fault detection methods at a local
level to achieve greater robustness and adaptability in fault
situations.
Agents also avoid some of the issues associated with active
control. Multiple-model control schemes often have one
active global controller, and a supervisor that decides
which controller should be active. A centralised supervisor
becomes a single point of failure, increasing the systems
reliance upon fault detection. In addition to this, a global
view on the system can make faults more complex to
diagnose. These centralisation issues are negated by MAC,
as are issues associated with adaptive control.
The unpredictability of centralised adaptive control schemes
should be alleviated by the decentralisation MAC offers.
Undesirable changes within modules will affect the sys-
tem as a whole to a lesser extent, perhaps even with
other agents adapting to counter-balance the unwanted
behaviours. Localisation of control may also improve on
response speed issues associated with adaptive control.
Nonetheless, there are a number of potential issues asso-
ciated with MASs that require careful attention such as
deliberation, communication and negotiation delays, agent
non-consensus and communication failure.
2.3 MACHRA Objectives
The HRA project's objectives include:
• Control of the elements resulting in a unified dynamic
for the HRA.
• Nominal or acceptable behaviour of the HRA in
element fault conditions.
• Graceful degradation of the HRA as fault levels
increase beyond their critical point.
If the inclusion of intelligence in the control scheme is to
be justified then the MA controlled HRA must achieve
tangibly more in comparison to passive methods. Thus,
the objective for MAC of an HRA also include:
Increased reliability - Robust techniques can be limited
in the number of faults or fault types they can accommo-
date. The structure of the HRA alleviates this problem, as
the number of elements reduces the overall affect of faults
on the system. Nevertheless, a more intelligent strategy
may accommodate even greater fault levels and fault types.
Improved nominal performance - Passive fault ac-
commodation methods require the controller design to be
robust enough to produce adequate performance during
faulty conditions. This can lead to conservative perfor-
mance in nominal conditions. An active control scheme
can offer an increase in nominal performance as the control
action can be changed in fault situations.
3. MACHRA SCHEME
The MACHRA scheme is currently in the investigative
stage, concentrating on parallel in series (PS) configura-
tions with lock-up and loose faults. Initial agent archi-
tectures and agency structures have been designed and
simulated.
At present, Matlab/Simulink is used to create and simulate
HRA assemblies, details of which can be found in [Davies
et al., 2008b]. Stateflow is used to simulate the inner rule-
based logic of the agents and their communication. This
provides a fast prototyping tool of the agents for use with
Matlab/Simulink.
The agent configuration and internal structuring was de-
tailed in [Davies et al., 2008a]. A brief overview of the
MACHRA scheme is provided here.
3.1 Agency Architecture
Figure 2. MACHRA agency architecture
The architecture of an agency is the configuration of
multiple agents on a macro scale. Figure 2 displays the
MACHRA scheme's agency architecture for a m×n HRA
PS configuration. There is an agent per parallel branch of
elements, each of which is responsible for the control and
detection of faults within its elements and communication
of faults to other agents.
All agents within this scheme are identical and peers,
consistent with the spirit of MAC where no hierarchy
should exist. A fixed outer control loop provides each
agent with an identical set-point. Communication between
agents is broadcasted via a bus. However, agents only
consider messages from structural neighbours. If lock-up
faults occur, the agent's structural neighbours will change
and thus different messages become relevant.
3.2 Agent Architecture
Figure 3. MACHRA agent architecture
The current agent architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.
This architecture has similarities with subsumption, first
introduced by [Brooks, 1986], that uses behaviours layered
in order of abstraction to produce more complex emergent
behaviors in a reactive time-frame. This reactivity is key
in the HRA as, due to the fast dynamics of the electro-
magnetic elements, a purely deliberative architecture may
not provide the response times needed.
The Fault Detection Module (FDM) is the most abstracted
layer, and thus affects those below it. As its name suggests,
the FDM detects faults in its elements. Currently, only one
fault type (lock-up faults) is detected. Future agents will
have more than one module, arranged either as peers in a
single layer or as separate layers ordered by the severity
of the fault type. The module contains rule-based logic
which determines the fault status of the element based on
sensory information and internal knowledge.
If a fault is detected, this information is passed to the
Fault Communication Module (FCM) where it is relayed
to other agents. Fault status messages from other agents
are also received here.
The most reactive layer is the Control Module (CM), which
provides the drive signal to the element based on the set-
point, and its knowledge of the system status. A multiple-
model control scheme is employed, as the CM contains a
look-up table with simple classical control designs based
on the number of active elements in the system.
Finally, a knowledge module containing both knowledge
given to the agent on start-up and that deduced within
the individual modules links the layers.
4. CONTROL OF A 10X10 HRA
This section will consider the control of a 10x10 HRA
using MAC concepts and a passive control approach for
comparison. [Davies et al., 2008a] gave an example of MAC
applied to a 4x4 system. As this system had a relatively low
level of modular redundancy in terms of the HRA concept,
the effects of faults on the system were relatively large. A
10x10 system is a more appropriate level of redundancy for
the HRA concept and thus it is worthwhile reconsidering
the effectiveness of active FTC in a system where faults
have less affect. In addition, the effects of reconfiguration
Table 1. Requirements
Performance Requirements
Travel Window ±0.06m (6× element travel)
Overshoot <2%
Rise Time <0.75s
Settling Time <1.20s
Table 2. Fault Cases
Case Description HRA State
Nom. All elements are healthy Healthy & capable
FC1 Branch nearest load locked Faulty, but capable
FC2 2 branches nearest load locked Faulty, but capable
FC3 3 branches nearest load locked Faulty, but capable
FC4 4 branches nearest load locked Critical fault level
delays and fault detection errors will be considered in the
MAC scheme.
4.1 Case Study System
The HRA system considered in this paper is, as previously
stated, a 10x10 system in parallel-series (PS) configura-
tion, which is structured as shown in Figure 2, with ten
branches of ten parallel elements arranged serially.
The actuation elements currently being used within the
project are SMAC electromagnetic actuators [SMAC,
2004]. The modelling of these actuators was considered
in [Davies et al., 2008b], and will not be detailed here. A
simplified 2 state element model is used in this example,
making the overall system 20th order.
The control is designed to meet some transient require-
ments, suitable to the system's technology with good sta-
bility margins. These requirements are given in Table 1.
The PS configuration of HRA is most affected by lock-
up faults, as a locked element will fix its whole parallel
branch of elements from the preceding surface to the next.
Loose faults are naturally accommodated by this struc-
ture, as parallel elements compensate for loose elements
in the branch. Thus, lock-up faults are considered in this
example.
It is assumed that this system is designed for an applica-
tion with travel requirements that need at least 6 of the 10
parallel branches to be operational. Hence, up to 4 lock-up
faults in separate branches would be tolerable in this case
and this level of faults will be considered here. 1-4 faults
are injected in a worst-case manner (in separate branches),
as described in Table 2.
4.2 Control Schemes
Figure 4 represents both the passive control and MAC
schemes.
The passive scheme has cascaded classical controllers de-
signed to meet the control objectives in nominal condi-
tions. The inner loops have a phase advance compensator
controlling the local position of each parallel branch of
elements. This spreads the travel between the elements
equally. An outer loop controller is then included to control
the overall travel of the HRA as a whole. Proportional-
Figure 4. Global and agent control schemes
integral control is used in the outer loop to achieve the
steady state requirements.
This passive control scheme is used as the base for the
MAC approach. Under nominal conditions, the MA con-
trolled system is identical to the passively controlled sys-
tem. When a fault is detected by an agent, however, this
fault is communicated throughout the agency and the
control laws are changed. The outer loop is not reconfig-
ured, as this would compromise the localisation of fault
detection and reconfiguration decision, producing a single
point of failure, as mentioned previously.
The feed-forward gain in the agent's control module is
changed to redistribute the travel demand of the system
i.e. if the system was nominal and one element locks then
the gain would be changed from 1/10 to 1/9, as there are
nine active element branches remaining.
In addition to this, the parameters in the local phase
advance controller are also reconfigured. This is necessary
as lock-ups in the system effectively increase the mass of
the system: operational elements now have to work upon
the dead mass of the faulty actuator as well as the load. An
increase in the speed of the local controller can improve the
performance of the remaining operational elements. Hence,
in the agent's control module there is a look-up table of
pre-computed control parameters based on the number of
locked element branches in the system. In effect, this is a
decentralised multiple-model control scheme, as there are
a number of local controller designs based on fault models
of the system.
It would also be possible to apply adaptive control using
this approach. However, a multiple-model based approach
was favoured as this aids verification of robustness and
stability that would be necessary for high integrity appli-
cations for which HRA is intended for.
4.3 Simulation of Fault Cases
Figure 5 displays the response of the passively controlled
and MAC schemes under nominal and faulty conditions
as previously described in Table 2, when a step change of
0.05m in the reference was applied at t=0. All faults were
introduced at the beginning of the simulation. Table 3
gives the gain margins and transient characteristics of
these responses.
Figure 5. Step response of passive and MAC 10x10 HRA
Table 3. Passive control and MAC HRA
Fault Case Over- Rise Settling Gain Phase
shoot Time Time Margin Margin
Nominal 1.88% 0.68s 1.03s ∞ 74deg
Passive FC1 1.01% 0.75s 1.20s ∞ 76deg
Passive FC2 1.01% 0.88s 1.48s ∞ 79deg
Passive FC3 1.01% 1.05s 1.85s ∞ 82deg
Passive FC4 1.10% 1.33s 2.26s ∞ 86deg
MACS FC1 1.68% 0.68s 1.04s ∞ 74deg
MACS FC2 1.70% 0.68s 1.04s ∞ 75deg
MACS FC3 1.96% 0.71s 1.07s ∞ 75deg
MACS FC4 1.94% 0.73s 1.29s ∞ 77deg
It can be observed that lock-up faults cause the system to
slow. In the passive control case, the rise time and settling
time increase significantly, and the requirements are not
met when two or more actuation branches are locked.
In the MAC case, the increase in rise time and settling
time can be reduced significantly, producing a response
that is very similar to nominal conditions. The transient
requirements are met in all fault conditions, apart from
the settling time requirement in FC4.
These results illustrate that a MAC approach can provide
near nominal performance in a realistically scaled HRA
under realistic fault levels. This is an improvement on the
passive control case.
4.4 Reconfiguration Delays
The MAC results given in Section 4.3 assumed that faults
were detected and communicated instantaneously within
the MAC architecture. This is not a realistic assumption.
The detection of faults will take some finite period, as will
the communication of these faults to the other agents. In
addition, on receiving fault messages, the agents will take
time to change their control parameters, and if multiple
faults occur simultaneously, multiple messages get passed
throughout the agency, and an agent will effectively step
through these parameters until the final fault status has
settled.
All of these effects must be considered in the simulation
if the results are to resemble reality. Figure 6 shows the
transient responses of a more realistic MAC 10x10 HRA in
comparison to the previous passive control case and MAC
without delays. The fault detection, communication and
control reconfiguration are all simulated using Stateflow,
which introduced delays into the system.
Figure 6. Transient response of passive, ideal MAC and
MAC with delays
A square-wave input is applied to the system and all faults
were injected at t=0. The response shows that in the
first half period of the input, delay effects are present in
the more realistic MAC scheme. However, after all faults
are detected, communicated and control reconfigured the
system's behaviour returns to that of the ideal MAC case.
Figure 7. Initial response of passive, ideal MAC and MAC
with delays
Figure 7 shows the initial response in more detail. Total
reconfiguration of the system was attained after 0.35s.
This delay increases the settling time and overshoot of
the response in the first half period. The overshoot limit
is exceeded in FC1, FC2 and FC3. If this was critical,
then the agent's control reconfiguration could be adjusted
to slow down reconfiguration, or reduce control gains until
the fault state is stable. The effects of delays would also be
Table 4. False detection
No.of False Detects 1 2 3 4
Overshoot 1.88% 4.04% 6.16% 8.18%
Phase Margin 72deg 70deg 68deg 66deg
Table 5. False detection with reconfiguration
No.of False Detects 1 2 3 4
Overshoot 1.58% 1.51% 1.66% 1.57%
Phase Margin 74deg 74deg 74deg 75deg
lessened if the faults did not occur simultaneously, which
is likely to be the case in a real situation.
4.5 Misdiagnosis in MACHRA
Misdiagnosis of faults in active FTC systems can be
problematic. If the system adapts to a change that has
not actually occurred in the system, then the results could
degrade performance, cause faults or induce instability.
Equally, if the system's control relies upon faults being
detected and a fault is not detected then the results could
be similar. Misdiagnosis of faults in this particular system
will be considered briefly here.
Undetected faults should not cause problems in this par-
ticular scheme. At worst, the system's response will be
that of the passive case. The system will become slower,
but stability will be maintained. This is due to the outer
loop control. If no outer loop was in place, the same
response under working fault detection conditions could
be achieved. However, an undetected fault would result in
a significant steady state error for the overall HRA as the
feed-forward agent control gains are not reconfigured.
False detection of faults in this MAC scheme will result
in gain and inner control law changes, which could lead
to instability. Table 4 gives the overshoot, gain and phase
margins in the case of 1-4 false lock-up detections. The
phase margin decreases, but the system retains stability.
The overshoot, however, rises significantly. This is unlikely
to be acceptable in an application, however four false de-
tections may also be unlikely given a robust fault detection
algorithm.
The flexibility of a MAC scheme can handle this problem
through further reconfiguration. If the control law of the
`locked' agent is changed to force those elements into a
locked state at time of detection, then this decrease of
the stability margins can be avoided. This approach was
applied and simulation results are shown in Table 5. On
the triggering the FDM, the input reference of the agent
is fixed to the local position at time of detection and the
controller is changed to a PI compensator. This forces the
system to behave as the detected fault case. Subsequently,
the phase margin is not eroded and the overshoot limit
achieved.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
The case for MAC of HRA has been made and the current
MAC scheme described. It has been shown that, at this
moderately high level of modular redundancy for HRA,
MAC still provides significant benefits in comparison to
passive control under realistic fault levels. Near nominal
performance can be maintained in worst case fault scenar-
ios.
Reconfiguration delays in MAC can affect the response
until full reconfiguration has been achieved. These effects
may be considered acceptable, due to their ephemeral
nature. Non-detection will result in the performance of
a passive system. However, false detections will result in
decreases in the stability margins. MAC offers a solution
to this problem, by reconfiguring the control of agents that
have detected a fault.
Practical testing of MAC on a experimental electro-
magnetic HRA is planned, which should give an indication
of such a scheme's performance in a real-world situation.
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